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Contemporary cinema has become brain--cinema, in the sense that very often the camera has moved almost literally into the characters' heads. It is possible to think given. Typically, characters are hooked up to some kind of brain machine but such literal reference to neurological devices is not necessary to demonstrate that contemporary screen culture has changed on an aesthetic and an ontological level.
Following from Gilles Deleuze's distinction between classical film as movement--images and modern postwar film as time--images, I propose calling contemporary cinema of the digital age 'neuro--images'. 1 Arguing that cinema has become a brain cinema naturally raises the question of the body. Where does the body go? Doesn't the concept of the neuro--image confirm the traditional dualism between body and mind? Does it mean I accept the current deterministic 'We are our brain' discourse-one of the current paradigms in neuroscience-which runs the risk of reductionism, excluding not only the body but also the world? I would argue that this is not the case. That is, it is not the case if the neuro--image is understood in a new materialist way, where body, brain and world are entangled in what Karen Barad proposes as a non--representationalist, diffractional approach to matter and meaning. Barad does not speak specifically about cinema or the cinematographic, but here I argue that her ideas can be related productively to a post--Deleuzian conception of contemporary image culture and its specific temporal and cosmic dimensions of consciousness.
-BEYOND REPRESENTATION OF TIME
Both Barad and Deleuze have argued against representationalism and have
proposed a more complex understanding of the connections between the world, science and philosophy. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze demonstrated that the dominant 'image of thought' is governed by representation, which means understanding difference in terms of identity, analogy, resemblance and opposition.
Deleuze's objection to representational thought is that by understanding difference only in such a reductionist 'principium comparationis' (real as opposed to imaginary; actual as opposed to virtual; man as opposed to woman, and so on) we cannot see the differences that matter. Deleuze's proposal is to think difference in itself, and in combination with a complex understanding of repetition for itself. 2 In
Meeting the Universe Halfway, Barad also sets out to provide an alternative to representation. Barad explains representationalism as the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they claim to represent. She argues in particular against the idea that that which is represented 'is held to be independent of all practices of representing'. 3 Also in Barad's view, representationalism has a problematic 'principium comprationis' at work, since representation involves a reflection, a mirror--image that can be compared to the 'real thing'. Both Deleuze and Barad propose a worldview in which all elements (things, images and instruments of measurement) intra--act and act on the world more directly and as such act in the world more directly. For Deleuze, cinematographic images have performative power; they do not just represent the world at a distance, but also operate with and in the world (like books, they 'form a rhizome with the world'). 4 And Barad shows how a performative understanding of scientific practices 'takes account of the fact that knowing does not come from standing at a distance and representing but rather from a direct material engagement with the world'. 5 Both, then, propose a new materialist approach to phenomena in the world beyond the dualism of representationalism.
In the 1980s, when he wrote The Movement--Image and The Time--Image, Deleuze argued that in assessing cinema it would be useful to see how the screen, the cinematographic image, is related to the biology of the brain. ' [T]he brain is the screen,' he said famously in Cahiers du Cinema. 6 Much has been written about the differences between the movement--image and the time--image; here I look instead at contemporary cinema and elements of a third mode of cinema. But before doing so, I
will recall briefly the ways in which Deleuze has characterised the non--dualist relations between body, brain, world and screen in the great modes of cinema that he introduced. 7 As Deleuze has demonstrated, in the classical cinema of the movement--image relations between body, brain, world and screen are organic. They function according to the habitual and automatic sensory--motor schemes that we have incorporated. In the movement--image this organic relation between man and the world finds expression in many forms, but there is a basic principle that can guide us. Looking at the temporal ontology of this type of organic, sensory--motor cinema, the present is something we can rely on. In the movement--image the present gives us (as spectators), as well as the characters, a foundation in time that allows our bodies to orientate in space and allows our thoughts to relate to the perceived present. When we are in the present, everything we see has an organic relation to the world of the characters. A memory in the movement--image is always an organic flashback that is provoked by and related to the present-but also always clearly distinct from that present: the actual (present) and the virtual (past) are clearly distinguishable. In Daybreak for instance, every object (a teddy bear, a photo), every detail in the room in which Jean Gabin has locked himself, is impregnated with organic significance. 8 Each object opens up another recollection in flashback. We always return from the past with a little more knowledge with which to perceive the present situation and understand how and why the character ended up in that room, surrounded by the police. The movement--image gives us organic relations of body, brain and world, expressed on the screen in a temporal ontology of the present as stable sensory--motor foundation.
As Deleuze has demonstrated, this organic sensory--motor relation has changed with the time--image. World War II broke the habitual and organic sensory--motor link of man/woman and the world, and a different ontological relation to time became more dominant. Amid the ruins of the war, a new mode of brain-bodyscreen-world relations emerged. Characters no longer knew how to move and act; they became wonderers and wanderers, seers, imprisoned by the traumas of the past, as in Roberto Rosellini's Germany Year Zero (1948). It is not that these characters represent the traumatic experience of the war (even if this can be argued for on one level of understanding). Rather, the cinematographic apparatus connects to the new world order (or, rather, disorder) in an entangled way: following, exploring, expressing and producing new relations to the world. What happened in the time--image's temporal ontology is that instead of having a firm foundation in the present, the past becomes more dominant. In Hiroshima Mon Amour, for instance, layers of both the collective past and the personal past start to 'flash up' in the present; almost involuntary the past starts to speak for itself. These images are not chronologically connected to the present, but they are more repetitive and haunting, popping up as reminders of the impossible and the intolerable that has happened , which has not yet found an organic place to rest or to be understood. Similarly, the characters, and we as spectators, can no longer be sure about the difference between the virtual (past) and the actual (present). The enigmatic characters in Last Year in Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 1961) make us wonder about many things. 9 What happened last year? Is Marienbad a memory or a dream? Are we ever in the present anyway? All the films Deleuze defines as time--images exemplify how the link between body-brain-screen-world has changed fundamentally. It is now grounded in (co--existing layers of) the past, which the cinematographic apparatus connects to and at the same time produces.
Deleuze's conceptualisation of images has a Bergsonian inspiration that needs to be considered, with its continuous but variegated relationship between matter and memory, between the outside world of perception and the inner workings of memories, between the actual and the virtual. There is a perpetual exchange of the virtual and the actual, to the point where more profound changes can be noticed. In the time--image the virtual (from the past) gains more independent power, obstructing habitual sensory--motor action (in the present). Images, to be conceived as blocks of matter--memory, undergo a 'mutation'. 10 It is a mutation within the virtual and actual forces contained within the image. This new mode of cinematography does not simply provide a different point of view on the world as, for instance, Rancière proposes to see the difference between movement--images and time--images. Something more profound within the temporal ontology of the image itself has changed. 11 These changes are immanently related to the world.
While World War II is a marker for these shifts, Deleuze never argues it was the only cause of the remarkable change in cinema. There were internal causes, such as the limits of the movement--image in turning into clichés or into propaganda; and external influences such as the war and its direct consequences for European cinema production, including the development of new and lighter, more moveable cameras and other equipment, not to mention the deep traumatic effects the war had on the general population: the crisis which has shaken the action--image [i.e. movement--image] has depended on many factors which only had their full effect after the war, some of which were social, economic, political, moral and others internal to art, to literature, to cinema in particular. We might mention, in no particular order, the war and its consequences, the unsteadiness of the 'American Dream' in all its aspects, the new consciousness of minorities, the rise and inflation of images both in the external world and in people's minds, the influence on the cinema of the new modes of narrative with which literature had experimented, the crisis of Hollywood and its old genres… 12 The list of 'causes' is inconclusive. It is clear we cannot speak of one linear causal relation between a 'given' historical cause and an aesthetic expression. In fact, it could be argued that Deleuze's conception of the aesthetics of the movement--image and time--image are closer to what Karen Barad has called 'phenomena' of entangled matter--meaning that call for a new conceptualisation of causality. Barad redefines materiality in the spirit of Niels Bohr's quantum philosophy-physics, conceiving any phenomenon as entangled matter and meaning, composed of intra--acting human and nonhuman practices. 13 As Barad describes in Meeting the Universe Halfway, this new form of causality needs to be seen as various related agential apparatuses at work within the phenomenon. 14 The relations between different agencies are important because they constitute the phenomenon. In fact, 'relations precede or determine the relata'. 15 The entangled nature of different agential forces, or apparatuses, does not mean that everything is conflated in a pool of undifferentiated mass, but that within phenomena differences come to matter. 16 It is impossible here to do justice to Barad's sophisticated and extended explication of this new non--dualist conception of materialism, and I will only raise one other central concept in her conception of matter. This is 'diffraction', the trope Barad uses as an alternative for 'reflection', which is usually employed to understand the relation between things (such as world reflected in images) in representationalism. Barad uses the concept to describe her methodological approach to attending to 'specificities of relations of difference and how they matter'. As she explains, where the metaphor and physical phenomenon of reflection implies mirroring and sameness (comparable to the dominant 'image of thought' that Deleuze describes in Difference and Repetition), 'diffraction is marked by patterns of difference'. 17 Reflection is based on the idea that representations have no effect on the object of representation, because the world is held at a distance. In diffraction, the world is entangled with material--discursive practices that engage in its becoming through intra--actions. 18 Transposing Barad's methodology to cinema, we can see that Deleuze's conception of images is fundamentally intra--agential in this new materialist sense: screens and the images on our screens are not distinct from the world (as second order representations at distance) but they form an integral part with it. Cinematographic images are part of the fabric of the world that is woven between screens, bodies and brains and nonhuman phenomena. Cinema has performative power in that cinematographic images are intra--agents that contribute to the emergence of new phenomena (thoughts, memories, actions), all juggling the actual and the virtual. 19 In this sense, it can also be suggested that the movement--image and the time--image continue to become, mutate and change together with other phenomena in the world. When I am arguing that in the neuro--image we have yet a different relation between brains, bodies, screens and worlds, then, I do not mean to imply that the old relations have disappeared or that there has been a total break. Rather, the image has evolved, as has our ontological relationship to the world and such as MRI scans). All these events have precursors, and none of these events is uni--directly related to changes in the aesthetics and ontology of the image. 20 The simple observation that I want to make here, though, is that in a new materialist conception of the image, all these agents cooperate within and with the image--in--becoming.
Before delving more deeply into the notion of the embodied and embedded nature of the brain in the neuro--image, which needs to be seen in close connection to some strands in contemporary neuroscience, I offer a few words about how the temporal ontology of the neuro--image is entangled with the rise of digital technology. It is both these aspects of the neuro--image-the digital as related to its specific temporal relations and neuroscience as related to the body-that I develop in the remainder of this essay.
-THE MAKING OF TEMPORALITY: DATABASE LOGIC AND OPEN FUTURES
If one compares the temporal ontology of contemporary cinema of the digital age to previous image types, it is striking that the future has become such an important temporal reference. It is not that there was no concept of the future in previous image regimes; one can think of the future from both the present (as a habitual anticipation) or from the past (as a cyclic repetition based on knowledge of the past). Rather, we can observe that the future has gained a different status as the dominant temporal framework of our age. Compared to the certainty of the present as safe anchor in the movement--image, and to the haunting return of the past in the time--image, in the neuro--image the future as such (always to some degrees undetermined) has become the most important time--scale from which to think and rethink the present and the past. In the larger argument about the temporal dimensions of the neuro--image I explain these differences in temporal ontologies in the movement--image, time--image and neuro--image by referring to the three It is not so difficult to see that we have entered a period in which we, collectively, predominantly think from a future--perspective. One simply needs to think of polling, profiling, pre--emptive measurements and other predictions and pattern recognitions that determine increasingly our actions in politics, policing and prevention strategies. This obsession with the future enfolds in itself again many intra--agential forces. But one particular 'strong intra--agential force' is digital technology-especially the way everything can be stored in databases that accumulate increasing amounts of documents, images, sounds, files and other information. These Big Data databases have several characteristics, including random access and algorithmic pattern search, comparison and reconfigurations, and reordering. A concrete, albeit obvious, example from contemporary cinema makes this clear. In the film Minority Report (2002), it is Tom Cruise's character's job to prevent crimes before they have happened, based on predictions by clairvoyants.
The narrative of this film shows what it means to think and act based on indeterminate speculations from the future. But the logic behind the power of prediction that informs the actions is connected to the fact that every past, present and predicted crime can be stored digitally in databases. Significantly, too, Minority
Report introduces the touch screen five years before it became a common object with the iPhone-indeed, at designer conferences this film is often cited as a virtual inspiration for the iPhone's screen. The touch screen and the tactile and affective qualities of the image are also part of the digital logic of the neuro--image, to which I will return. What I most want to point out here is that the digital implies a database logic that allows for all kinds of reconfigurations, remixings and re--orderings of past and present events. It is important to read images in the archive for their ambiguity and open--endedness. Migrants were often filmed in relation to debates about crime or social problems, so that's how they get fixed in official memory. But that Caribbean woman standing in a 1960s factory isn't thinking about how she is a migrant or a burden on the British state; she's as likely to be thinking about what she's going to eat that evening or about her lover. 25 Akomfrah adds that the biggest challenge of working with the archive is that one has to work with what there is. History in itself is not changed. But we can create different relations to it, because there is a radical contingency in the actualised forms of history and indeterminacy within the layers of time. This allows it to be bended and reshaped in concrete forms that can escape from mnemonic depths and get a new life, thus creating a new possibility for the future. For Deleuze this is important for keeping open the possibility of a future that differs from the past, important for his idea of politics and a 'people to come'. 26 Barad, referring to Derrida rather than Deleuze, also emphasises 'the possibilities for justice--to--come [which] resides in every morsel of finitude'. 27 This is the politics of material diffractional practices in which matter and meaning are intensely entangled ontologically, epistemologically and ethico--politically. Barad, too, argues that it is not that we can undo the past but that 'the past is open to change. It can be redeemed, productively reconfigured in an iterative unfolding of spacetimematter'. 28 Arguing from a quantum mechanics perspective, Barad calls this the making of temporality, which seems to resonate in important ways with Deleuze's third synthesis of time:
[Time] is not universally given, but rather time is articulated and re--synchronized through various material practices … what we take to be the past and what we take to be the present and the future are entangled with one another … they exist in intra--active entanglements. That is the only reason we get a diffraction pattern, by the way. And importantly, the original diffraction pattern doesn't return, a new one is created, one in which the diffraction (that is, entanglement effects) is a bit challenging to trace. So, the issue is not one of erasure and return. What is at issue is an entanglement, intra--activity. The 'past' was never simply there to begin with, and the 'future' is not what will unfold, but 'past' and 'future' are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through the world's ongoing intra--activity … the fantasy of erasure is not possible, but possibilities for reparation exist. 29 When I suggest that the neuro--image has its own particular temporal configuration of time, predominantly 'made' from the future (or possible future scenarios), this is a temporal logic that is entangled with the concrete material practice of cinematography (as a practice of rewriting history) in the digital logic of our contemporary age. It is not that the third synthesis of time has only come into being with the neuro--image; the three syntheses of time form a temporal ontology of modern man more generally. 30 But I do want to argue that one 'apparatus of measurement' that is an agential practice which has performative power and influences how we conceive our temporal relations are our digital tools, entangled as they are with our conception of time as predominantly conceived from the future.
-THE EMBODIED BRAIN IN CONTEMPORARY COSMIC CINEMA
As indicated earlier, a salient characteristic of the neuro--image as cinema of the digital age is that we increasingly experience the world from within a character's brain space. This is related 'intra--agentially' to the enormous growth of neuroscience and the prominent place of the brain in the culture of our times. The dominance of the brain in contemporary culture has met considerable criticism, especially from a humanities and social science perspective where the reductionist idea that 'we are our brain' has been problematised. 31 However, contemporary neuroscience has many branches, some of which are increasingly taking the embodied and embedded nature of the brain into account. Arguably, these approaches imply a more modest, or at least a more interconnected, place for the brain. 32 In the neuro--image, too, we encounter an embodied and embedded brain 'bad' continuing extra--orbitally. In spite of enormous differences in modes of narration, the cinematographic cosmic explorations of these films that reinvented the science fiction genre are all related to actual space--travel. With varying degrees of metaphysical depth, they all show characters that explore galactic space extensively by leaving the planet Earth. As Deleuze indicated when discussing Kubrick's space odyssey, the cosmology of galaxies can meet the inside of the brain in a philosophical and scientific search for life and death. 36 The cosmic continues to be an important reference--point for metaphysical investigation, and has become an even more profound dimension of twenty--first century cinema. An important difference, however, is that actual space--travel is no longer an absolute condition for cosmic consciousness. The cosmos has become part of our consciousness without the need to show space travellers literally leaving the terrestrial orbit. In any event, even in Gravity, as I will argue, the relation between Earth and the other planets tends to be explored intensively (in time, in the mind) rather than extensively (in space). The neuro--image is also profoundly occupied with an intensive cosmic consciousness different from the space explorations in the previous generation of films mentioned above. The Spanish film Earth is an early example of this new intense cosmic cinema. 37 The main character of the film, Angel, is a woodlice fumigator on a Spanish island. Dressed in a white fumigator suit, standing in the red stony landscape of the island, he looks like an astronaut on Mars.
Throughout the film, suggestions are made that he is an angel descended from heaven-or, that he suffers from schizophrenia and thinks he is an angel descended from heaven. The narrative keeps his actual status ambiguous. In any case, Angel seems to be a mental space traveller. He regularly refers to the mysterious and awesome complexity of both the brain and the cosmos. In Earth we never leave the planet and yet we travel into the cosmic dimensions of the universe through the mental journey of its main character.
Lars von Trier's Melancholia (2011) is another example. This film is the expression of pure affect, a pure intense, inner experience. It is an apocalyptic story where the Earth is hit by another planet, Melancholia. But more than that, the planet Melancholia is the expression of depression and fear, embodied by Justine and her sister, Claire. Jackman and Rachel Weisz. In the present, the twenty--first century, Tom is a brain surgeon who tries to find a cure for his wife Izzy, who has a brain tumour. She is dying; she will die. He wants to find a cure for death. This story unfolds into the past where conquistador Thomas wants to save Spain and the Queen Isabelle by finding a holy tree, the tree of life, in the New Spain; and into the future where the astronaut Tom travels through space in a biospheric 'bubble--ship', and tries to deal with the However, I focus in this last section on Gravity's cosmic new materialism. Gravity is as much about mourning, death, love and life as the other cosmic neuro--images that I have mentioned. While tethered on a space ship, dealing with the loss of gravity, trying to avoid orbital debris and finding her way back to earth in broken equipment, medical engineer Ryan Stone (Sandra Bullock) is coping with the loss of her daughter. Most of the film we are inside Stone's capsule, even inside her head. At certain moments we know for sure that we are experiencing the delirium of this desperate main character. It is when she is hallucinating that her colleague, astronaut Matt Kowalski (George Clooney), who just died, returns to tell her not to give up. But the whole film can be considered a delirious 'neuro--image', an inner struggle presented as an outer space adventure, as 'two forces of death which embrace'. 41 Cuarón's Gravity is as visually stunning as Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey, but it is no longer science fiction. What we see is not a futuristic image that projects an image of the future from the past and the present into outer space; rather, it is a realistic image of 'the future that is now', a spacetime from which we can look back VOLUME21 NUMBER2 SEP2015 Figure 5 : Screen shots from Gravity (Alfonso Cuarón, 2013) at the Earth. So again, the idea of the future as such, the future as third synthesis of time from which to think back (and not project forward as in Kubrick's film), is the dominant temporal dimension of this film. The future was the most important dimension, even on the level of production design.. Strikingly, the film was post--produced before pre--production or production. 42 Sandra Bullock was literally strapped in a tank, a 'temporary tomb' that was her space pod, that gave her no room to move and which gave us the powerful experience of being locked in her mental space as much as her physical space. <www.patriciapisters.com>.
